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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS - PROHIBTIONS
ON THE PUBLICATION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ANONYMOUS CAMPAIGN LITERA-
TURE - Defendant was charged under a federal statute' with the publica-
tion and distribution of a pamphlet which concerned a candidate for
1 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1958) which provides a fine or imprisonment for "whoever will-
fully publishes or distributes or causes to be published or distributed . . . any . . .
pamphlet,. . . writing, or other statement relating to or concerning any person who has
publicly declared his intention [to be a candidate in any federal election], which does
not contain the name of the persons, associations, committees, or corporations responsible
for the publication or distribution of the same ...-. " A number of states have similar
statutes. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1714 (1949); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3599.09 (Page Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3546 (1938). Such statutes have
been held not to violate state constitutional guarantees. State v. Freeman, 143 Kan.
315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936); State v. Babst, 104 Ohio 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922); Common-
wealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1945). But see Ex parte Harrison, 212
Mo. 88, 110 S.W. 709 (1908).
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United States Senator in a special senatorial election and which did not
contain the name of the person or group responsible for its publication
and distribution as required by the statute. The defendant alleged that
his occupation as a farmer made him particularly subject to regulation by
the federal government, and that he feared coercion or reprisals from the
federal representatives with whom he dealt if he complied with the statute's
disclosure requirement. On motion to dismiss the information on the
ground that the statute was in violation of the first amendment of the
Constitution, held, motion denied. Congress has the power to punish the
publication and distribution of unsigned pamphlets concerning announced
candidates in federal elections because the value to the public in knowing
the source and purpose of such materials when evaluating their content
outweighs the asserted right to publish and distribute political literature
anonymously. United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961).
In Talley v. California2 the Supreme Court had before it a municipal
ordinance which forbade the distribution of "any handbill in any place
under any circumstances" which did not disclose on its face the name and
address of the person who printed or wrote the handbill and the person
who caused it to be distributed.3 Finding the ordinance by its language
to be unlimited in scope, and because of the lack of any legislative history
which would indicate a contrary intent, the Court held it void on its face.4
The Court noted that such an identification requirement would tend to
restrict freedom of expression since fear of coercion or reprisals could deter
lawful and significant public discussion. 5 Since disclosure was the only
requirement imposed by the ordinance, the Court clearly recognized
anonymity as necessary to the effective exercise of freedom of expression.
Acknowledging that other factors might have to be weighed in future
determinations, however, the Court in Talley carefully reserved the ques-
tion raised by the principal case-the extent to which anonymity will be
protected where required disclosure would tend to restrain political ex-
pression but where the disclosure requirement is directed at a specific evil.6
The court in the principal case did not analyze the restrictive nature
of this statute closely. It focused on the effect of the statute upon this
defendant, concluding that the possibility of actual reprisals by the gov-
ernment representatives with whom he dealt was remote. Therefore, the
court did not find any restraint upon his first amendment freedoms.7
2 562 U.S. 60 (1960). "The Defendant stakes his position 'almost exclusively' as he
stated on oral argument on the holding in Talley v. California ...... Principal case
at 442.
3 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
4 Id. at 65.
5 Id. at 64, 65.
a Id. at 64.
7 "The mere possibility of reprisal is not enough." Principal case at 443.
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The Talley decision indicates that such a statute must be viewed in a
broader perspective, however. There the Court, with no record evidence of
coercion or reprisals before it,8 concluded that such a disclosure require-
ment was inherently restrictive of freedom of expression. 9 The Court recog-
nized that the interest to be weighed was not that of the particular defend-
ant, but rather the interest of the people as a whole in being able to express
themselves without fear of onerous consequences. This should be particularly
true where, as in the principal case, the assertion of the right so intimately
involves the elective process, the area in which first amendment freedoms
are most often utilized and the very source of their characterization as
"fundamental."'10 The restrictive effect of such a disclosure requirement is
particularly offensive for two reasons. First, it operates as a prior restraint
on freedom of expression, albeit a self-imposed one in contrast to the more
typical cases of prior licensing." Secondly, such an identification require-
ment has the greatest deterrent effect upon unpopular or dissident groups
since few persons will hesitate to sign a pamphlet or writing expressing a
currently popular opinion or viewpoint. It seems clear that such a dis-
closure requirement constitutes a direct and substantial restraint upon
first amendment freedoms.
To justify such a limitation, "the subordinating interest of the state
must be compelling."' 2 The court found that Congress intended to
proscribe anonymous publications in the federal elective process as being
evil in themselves.' 3 No legislative history was cited to indicate the precise
8 862 U.S. 60, 69 (1960) (Mr. Justice Clark dissenting).
9 Id. at 64. Compare Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958). In each case, the Court, in denying the state's
right to compel the NAACP to produce its membership lists, had before it record
evidence that previous disclosures of membership in the organization had resulted in
public hostility, threats and economic reprisals. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
486 (1960) the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute requiring all the state's
teachers to disclose every organization with which they had been associated over the
past five years. The Court was willing to assume there would be no public disclosure
of the teachers' associational ties, yet it found sufficient restrictive effect on their right
of free association in the fact that these ties would be disclosed to the persons who
controlled their future employment as teachers.
10 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 808 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451 (1988); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 853, 864 (1937); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 23, 244 (1986).
11 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 823 U.S. 516 (1945); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 810
U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
12 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 284, 265 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurring).
'3 Compare Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1945), in
which the court upheld a state statute similar to the one in the principal case against
allegations that it violated state constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. The
court held that the "essence of the crime is anonymity," but argued disclosure was
justified since it did not deny anyone his right to print information; disclosure merely
made the writer assume responsibility for his material just as a speaker, exercising his
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nature or extent of this evil,14 nor did the court consider any other evidence
relevant to the necessity for such legislation. The court seemed to assume
that a significant danger existed and that the power of Congress to
legislate concerning the federal elective process15 was sufficient justification
for this statute. This finding must be read, however, in light of the court's
prior determination that the statute did not operate restrictively in this
case.16
The court's failure to examine closely the public interest here involved
is not consistent with the Supreme Court's approach in previous cases
involving federal statutes requiring registration or disclosure. These
statutes have generally been upheld, but only after a careful consideration
of congressional findings as to the nature and seriousness of the threat to
the governmental interest asserted, and the appropriateness of the means
adopted to combat the specific evil.17 When necessary, the Supreme Court
has then narrowly construed a statute so as to avoid any serious constitu-
tional objection. 8 The lack of a definitive congressional examination and
determination of the pertinent factors bearing upon this statute casts doubt
on both the sufficiency and pertinency of the legislative interest to justify
such a significantly restrictive statute. Thus this case presents a closer
balance of interests, and the factors involved deserve closer scrutiny, than
the court indicates.
Frank G. Reeder, S.Ed
right to free speech, identifies himself by his presence. See other cases cited note 1 supra.
This same argument was made by the dissenting Justices in Talley as the grounds for
refusing to recognize a right to anonymous expression. Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 71 (1960).
14 The only pre-enactment material pertaining to this statute seems to be S. R..
No. 1390, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), referring to the legislation as "implementing the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act" and facilitating the enforcement of certain reporting
provisions thereof. Compare Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 n.39 (1961) (four Justices dissenting) where the
Court referred to 18 U.S.C. § 612 as an example of a situation "in which secrecy or the
concealment of associations has been regarded as a threat to public safety and to the
effective, free functioning of our national institutions [and] Congress has met the threat
by requiring registration or disclosure."
15 United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
10 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
17 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 (1953); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943); Burroughs v. United States,
290 U.S. 534 (1934); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
18 Ibid.
1962] 509
